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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Finding the rightful measure of compensation will typically require us 
to first choose an appropriate baseline.  The baseline is how things would 
have gone for the plaintiff but for the defendant’s actions.  The difference 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
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between how things would have gone and how they actually went—
more precisely, the difference between the plaintiff’s baseline level of 
welfare and his actual level of welfare—is what we seek to compensate.  
Choosing that baseline is notoriously perplexing.  Several of the most 
perplexing problems it gives rise to prompted this conference.  Here is 
how they were laid out by the conference organizers: 
    Consider the plaintiff whose leg the defendant tortiously broke—thus preventing him from getting on the plane that crashed.  Consider the plaintiff whom defendant tortiously fails to warn of high voltage wires, resulting in plaintiff’s electrocution while—and a second before—falling to his death. 
Consider the plaintiff whose loss of legs due to defendant’s tortious conduct caused her to give up her career as a professional athlete—with the result that she is now much happier and has no regrets about losing her former career.  Consider the plaintiff who, due to defendant’s tortious conduct, is now much more churlish and psychologically unable to enjoy those things that give ordinary people pleasure. 
Consider the promisee of an enforceable contractual promise asking to be put in the position he would have been in had the promise been kept. 
Consider the plaintiff who but for defendant’s tortious conduct would not exist.  Consider the descendant of slaves who but for slavery would not have existed, and surely not in the United States.1 
These problems seem to me to fall into four clusters: Indeed, I have 
slightly rearranged and reparagraphed the original letter so as to indicate 
what these four clusters are.  My aim here will not be to solve the 
problem that each cluster raises, but rather to show what lies at the 
bottom of each.  Their roots, it will turn out, are quite divergent.  
Baseline problems are not all traceable to one and the same fundamental 
difficulty.  We will not be able to solve them until we appreciate the 
quite divergent sets of dilemmas that give rise to each of its various 
types.  The four types of cases I will be considering each spring from a 
separate kind of dilemma.  Laying those dilemmas bare—but not 
resolving them!—will be my aim here.  Once that is done, I actually 
think that a suitable resolution may well be in sight, but I am not going 
to go that far.  Here, the aim is simply to get to the bottom of what 
makes these compensation problems so hard. 
 
 1. Attachment to Letter from Larry A. Alexander, Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore to invited participants in the conference Baselines and Counterfactuals in the Theory of Compensatory Damages: What Do Compensatory Damages Compensate? (Oct. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Letter from Larry A. Alexander] (on file with author). 
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II.  THE FIRST CLUSTER: THE FAILURE-TO-WORSEN CASES 
    Consider the plaintiff whose leg the defendant tortiously broke—thus preventing him from getting on the plane that crashed.  Consider the plaintiff whom defendant tortiously fails to warn of high voltage wires, resulting in plaintiff’s electrocution while—and a second before—falling to his death.2 
A.  The Basic Dilemma 
In determining the victim’s rightful measure of compensation, ought 
we to take account of the doomed plane ride, from which the plaintiff 
was deflected by being run into by the defendant’s car and thus having 
his leg broken?  In other words, should we include the doomed plane 
ride in the baseline against which the plaintiff’s compensable harm is 
measured?  If we do, we would not judge the defendant liable for 
anything, since running the car into the plaintiff prevented far worse.  
This is the “counterfactual” approach to harm: We ask whether, but for 
the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff would be worse off and by how 
much; if, as here, the answer is that he would not be worse off at all, but 
on the contrary, better, the defendant avoids all liability. 
But there seems at least one other plausible way of looking at the 
matter, which we might call the “causal” approach: We might ask what 
harm the defendant caused, which, in this case, would be the broken leg; 
that would then lead us to impose some significant liability.  In other 
words, whereas the counterfactual approach allows us to net out the 
plane ride against the car crash, the causal approach does not. 
The electrocution case, mentioned alongside the car crash case, is but 
a variation on this theme.  To see this most clearly, it is worth transposing 
the electrocution case into the same factual setting as the car crash case.  
Suppose that the defendant’s running his car into the plaintiff does not 
merely break the plaintiff’s leg, but kills him.  Again, however, suppose 
that if the victim had not been killed in the car crash, he would have 
been killed on the plane ride he was about to undertake.  Once again, the 
question arises whether to net out the plane ride against the car crash.  If 
we do, by adopting the counterfactual approach, then the only difference 
between this case and the previous one is that the netting out here leaves 
the plaintiff with a small, as opposed to zero, claim: the harm done him 
 
 2. Id.  
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by accelerating his death ever so slightly.  If we adopt the causal approach, 
then of course the defendant is fully liable for the plaintiff’s death.  I 
will, for the most part, concentrate on the first case (the nonfatal car 
crash) and leave it to the interested reader to extrapolate from that to the 
electrocution case. 
Why should it be so hard to choose between what I called the 
counterfactual and the causal approaches?  Why is it that each of these 
diametrically opposed approaches continues to seem so compelling, 
even after one has stared at them for a good long while?  To get at what I 
take to be the heart of the problem, consider a slight variation of the car 
crash case.  Suppose the defendant who crashes his car into the victim 
actually knows that he is thereby averting a greater harm.  If he had such 
knowledge, it seems clear that we would net out the plane ride against 
the car crash.  We would do so either by judging the defendant to have a 
necessity defense for the harm he inflicted or by judging him not to have 
inflicted a harm at all.  That is, if the defendant knew, then the counterfactual 
approach would clearly be the right one.  The question is whether anything 
should change if the defendant crashes his car into the plaintiff not 
knowing what good he is accomplishing thereby. 
The issue here is virtually the same as one that has been the subject of 
a lively controversy in the criminal law: The defendant fires at his 
enemy, ignorant that the other is about to attack him, and he is therefore 
unknowingly acting in self-defense.  Or, the defendant starts a fire, 
ignorant that another fire is already raging and that this one will serve as 
a nice firebreak; he is thereby unknowingly acting under necessity.  One 
position taken with respect to these cases is that the defendant who does 
not know he has a defense is as blameworthy as the defendant who has 
no defense at all; he is guilty of murder and arson, respectively.  
Someone taking this position would presumably hold the car crasher 
liable for the victim’s leg and ignore the averted plane ride.  A second 
position taken with respect to these cases is that the defendant who does 
not know he has a defense is merely as blameworthy as someone who 
attempts a murder, or attempts arson, and fails.  The justifying circumstances 
are in effect construed to be part of the definition of the crime.  A 
murder is not simply an intentional killing; it is an intentional-killing-
without-a-defense.  Therefore someone who kills intentionally, not realizing 
he has a defense, is attempting to kill-without-a-defense, but failing 
therein since he actually has a defense.  Thus he is merely guilty of the 
attempt, not the completed offense.3 
 
 3. For major recent entries into the debate, see generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 101–06 (1998); MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME (1993); Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and Defense of Others, 27 PHIL. & PUB. 
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Noticing the connection between this debate and our own problem 
somewhat illuminates things, but I think still does not get us to the heart 
of the matter.  Nor does it help us resolve the issue, since the criminal 
law controversy has so far remained unresolved. 
However, the focus on the defendant who knows he is saving              
the victim’s life by crashing his car into him proves to be a fruitful 
one—provided we combine it with another point, a very basic fact about 
tort and criminal law, whose full implications are often missed.  Liability 
generally requires two things: wrongful means and harmful ends.  The 
same harmful ends, if attained by rightful means, do not result                 
in liability.  This is just a more abstract—but, as it will turn out, 
helpful—way of saying that to be liable for someone’s death, it is not 
enough that I have caused his death; I must have done so in a particular 
manner: typically, with a culpable state of mind (namely, intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently), via an act (as opposed to a mere 
omission), via a chain of events not deemed too circuitous (in other 
words, there must be proximate causation), and in the absence of a valid 
defense (like necessity or self-defense and the like). 
Let us now consider the car crash scenario with these two points in 
mind: the point that the defendant would clearly not be liable if he had 
known, and the point that liability requires both wrongful means and 
harmful ends. 
A wrongdoer, having produced a harmful end by wrongful means, 
might try to make the following argument: If I had attained those same 
ends by different means, I would not be liable.  But then the only thing I 
should ultimately be liable for is my failure to choose those rightful 
means, instead of the wrongful means I did choose.  Thus, in the car 
crash case, if I had brought about the same result (the broken leg) 
knowing that I was averting a worse catastrophe, I would not be liable.  I 
would then have brought about a harmful end (the broken leg) by a 
rightful means, inasmuch as I would have run into the leg to avert worse.  
It is true that I did in fact bring it about by wrongful means, since I did 
not know what good I was accomplishing.  But then all you are entitled 
to blame me for is the choice of those wrongful means—perhaps punish 
 
AFF. 123 (1998); Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547 (2002); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: 
Deeds v. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); Paul H. Robinson, The Bomb Thief and the Theory of Justification Defenses, 8 CRIM. L.F. 387 (1997). 
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me for some kind of criminal attempt—but what you cannot blame or 
hold me liable for is the harm I did. 
When such an argument is first made, it might not sound all that 
convincing.  Indeed one can quickly come up with examples that suggest 
that the argument is downright absurd.  Just imagine someone who 
intentionally shoots his victim and then argues that if he had done            
the same thing inadvertently—in other words, by more “innocent” 
means—he would be deemed innocent.  Therefore, he continues, he 
should only be blamed for reaching the harmful end of someone’s death 
by the impermissible means of shooting him intentionally rather than 
inadvertently, but not for causing his death.  Or, to illustrate the same 
point, imagine a rescuer who, recognizing that the person he has just 
rescued is someone he hates, throws him back into the sea to drown.  We 
would not allow him to argue that since he could have brought about the 
same end, the victim’s death, by alternative (but permissible!) means, 
namely by not rescuing him in the first place, the only thing he did 
wrong was to bring that end about by this particular wrongful means, 
and that, therefore, he should not be held liable for damages.  Coming 
from the mouth of the shooter or the “rescuer,” these arguments sound 
preposterous. 
And yet the preposterous sounding argument has more power to it than 
first appears.  Suppose you foresee inflicting a harm by one or another 
means, some permissible, some impermissible.  By incurring a certain 
expenditure in either money or effort or risk, you can make sure that the 
harm eventuates by a permissible, rather than an impermissible, means.  
Ought you to undertake that expenditure?  Not if it is at all substantial.  It 
seems quite clear that you should not go to great lengths to ensure that 
the victim is killed by a letting-die rather than a rescue-followed-by-an-
active-killing, or that he is run over accidentally rather than intentionally, or 
that the car is crashed into him with knowledge that the perpetrator is 
thereby averting a worse catastrophe rather than without such 
knowledge.  But if such an expenditure is not in fact called for, then how 
can we impose substantial liability for harm when it is not undertaken? 
Let me spell this last point out more fully, so that its force can be 
better appreciated.  Suppose the car crashing defendant argued as follows: I 
enjoy taking risks.  Indeed, I enjoy being downright reckless.  Needless 
to say, I do not enjoy being held liable.  If I will only be credited with 
the good consequences of my actions (like that averted plane ride) when 
I actually foresee them, I will henceforth investigate every risk-taking 
venture in which I engage more thoroughly, so as to become more fully 
aware of possible favorable consequences.  I will not alter my course of 
action one iota in light of this information.  But I will now act in greater 
awareness of the good, as opposed to the harmful, effects my risky 
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conduct might occasionally produce.  Such an investigation, had I 
conducted it, would in this case have led me to conclude that the plane 
the plaintiff was about to board faced a serious danger of mishap.  Do 
you really think I deserve to be held liable for not undertaking such 
efforts and expenditures when they could not possibly have affected my 
actions?4 
This strikes me as a very hard-to-answer argument.  And yet, if we 
accept it, it seems we would also have to accept the argument of the 
ordinary murderer who says that if he had done what he did with an 
innocent state of mind, he would not be guilty of murder, but merely an 
accidental killing.5  And that seems very hard to accept indeed.  The 
hard-to-answer argument and the hard-to-accept argument are the two 
horns of the dilemma that I believe lies at the heart of the failure-to-
worsen cases. 
B.  Related, But Distinct Problems 
My analysis so far has proceeded on the basis of two unstated 
assumptions which I should make explicit and defend. 
 
 4. Someone might try to get around this argument by arguing that only the defendant who is not merely aware of, but motivated by, the good consequences of his actions should get a break.  But neither this nor a host of possible variations on this objection are likely to work.  For each one could construct a case analogous to the one given to make the same point. 
  5. It might seem tempting to argue that the case of the ordinary murderer is different from all the others because one cannot arrange it, through careful planning and extensive expenditures, that one will kill inadvertently rather than intentionally.  But that is not true.  Often, one will be able to turn an intentional killing into an inadvertent one through sufficiently careful planning.  An example I have used previously would work as follows: Suppose defendant has taken out life insurance in the name of his son.  He then plans to set fire to his house, in the course of which he hopes his son will die.  To cover his tracks, he will do his darndest to try to save his son, once the fire has been started, but given the devastating nature of the conflagration he thinks that there is only about a forty percent chance that this rescue will succeed.  In other words, there is a sixty percent chance that his son will die.  At the last minute he has an idea for limiting his liability, in case he is discovered.  He changes the insurance policy to be triggered, not by the death of his son, but by the destruction of the house.  He keeps every other part of his original plan intact.  If under these circumstances his son dies—of which there is a sixty percent chance—the defendant will only be guilty of manslaughter. The death, if it occurs, will only have occurred as a byproduct of his plan to get the insurance money, rather than as a means toward that end; thus he will only have caused the death recklessly, rather than intentionally.  If we lower the son’s probability of death even further, he might not even qualify for that level of liability.  For a fuller discussion of this case and cases like it, see LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 1–131 (1996). 
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When I asked us to consider the case in which the defendant knows 
that by crashing his car into the plaintiff he is saving him from a doomed 
plane ride, I was tacitly assuming that this was the only way the 
defendant had of saving the plaintiff.  That is an admittedly unrealistic 
assumption, but it was necessary to bypass a distracting difficulty that is 
not really part of the basic dilemma the case raises.  Suppose we had 
proceeded on the more realistic assumption that the defendant has other, 
less injurious means available for saving the plaintiff and knows that he 
does.  Now it will be a very puzzling matter to decide whether his saving 
the plaintiff from a worse fate still exonerates him.  By its terms, the 
necessity defense only entitles one to commit wrongs that are necessary: 
Breaking the plaintiff’s leg is not, strictly speaking, necessary to save 
him.  And even putting aside this narrow doctrinal argument, it would 
seem as though granting the defendant a necessity defense, when he 
could have averted the calamity by much less injurious means, would 
lead to some highly peculiar consequences.  The philosopher Shelly 
Kagan, in a different context, offers the example of someone who saves 
a choking victim by applying the Heimlich maneuver, but who 
simultaneously stabs the victim in the thigh.6  (Why?  For no good 
reason, just for the hell of it.)  Would we forgive the stabbing because it 
accompanied the Heimlich maneuver?  Probably not.  But are we not 
doing the same thing when we grant the necessity defense to the 
defendant in the car crash case, when there are less injurious means 
available for saving the plaintiff?  Possibly.  But does that really mean 
we should hold him liable?  After all, there remains the hard-to-           
ignore fact that the defendant’s running the car into the plaintiff is a           
vast improvement on just letting him board the plane.  It is this side-
issue—what to do about a defendant who chooses the lesser, but not the 
least of several evils—which I tried to bypass by assuming that the 
defendant’s only recourse for saving the plaintiff was to crash the car 
into him. 
My second unstated assumption is a little harder to convey.  Imagine 
the car crash case had unfolded in a slightly different way than we have 
been imagining so far.  Let’s take the doomed plane ride out of it, but 
add another feature to the case instead.  Suppose that quite soon after the 
plaintiff has been injured, his wounds, although they initially appeared 
very serious, heal up completely, leaving behind no residual ill effects.  
In this case, of course it is quite clear that the plaintiff would not be 
entitled to any damages whatsoever.  The beneficial developments 
subsequent to the injury completely neutralize the harmful actions of the 
 
 6. SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 97 (1989).
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defendant.7  Now one might ask whether the avoidance of the doomed 
plane ride could not be viewed in the same way, as a beneficial 
development that completely neutralizes the harmful actions of the 
defendant.  Very abstractly put, it could indeed.  But it also seems quite 
clear that we treat differently “neutralizing” beneficial developments that 
follow closely on the heels of the original harmful acts, both temporally 
and physically, as well as being similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
to the harm they neutralize.  I assumed the plane ride case not to be of this 
variety.  Otherwise my analysis could, of course, have been far simpler. 
III.  THE SECOND CLUSTER: THE RAW UTILITY PROBLEM 
Consider the plaintiff whose loss of legs due to defendant’s tortious conduct  caused her to give up her career as a professional athlete—with the result that she is now much happier and has no regrets about losing her former career.  Consider the plaintiff who, due to defendant’s tortious conduct, is now much more churlish and psychologically unable to enjoy those things that give ordinary people pleasure.8 
A.  The Basic Dilemma, Vaguely Stated 
Two people suffer an accident.  Both have their careers derailed.  Both 
end up having to make new lives for themselves.  The first ends up much 
happier for the experience, fate having tossed her into a direction much 
more congenial to her; the second ends up miserable, fate having 
deflected her from the best possible life for her.  Is it anything other than 
self-evident that the first person has been harmed less than the second?  
And that if there is a culprit behind each of the accidents, he ought to 
pay more for the greater harm he did in the second than in the first case?  
Yet most of the law conflicts with such common sense. 
Raw utility, happiness pure and simple, counts for surprisingly little in 
the law.  Tax law is in some ways the most glaring and paradoxical-seeming 
example of this.  Two people derive equal amounts of happiness from 
life.  One does so by earning a high income and then spending it on 
things that generate a great deal of utility for him.  Another does so by 
earning a very small income and getting lots of nonpecuniary 
satisfactions from his ill-paid job.  Those nonpecuniary benefits are not 
 
 7. Anthony Dillof puts this distinction to extremely interesting use in his analysis.  
See Dillof, supra note 3, at 1549.
  8. Letter from Larry A. Alexander, supra note 1. 
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taxed.  That strikes many people as strange: Both work to produce the 
utility necessary for a happy life.  They do so in slightly different ways.  
And the law treats them radically differently.  Why would the law 
reward someone just for being lucky enough to be able to achieve 
happiness without going through the intermediate process of first 
earning money to buy it?  The conventional answer is that it is too 
impractical to try to tax all nonpecuniary benefits.  We tax such benefits 
when we can: when they are discrete and easily valued, like the use of a 
company car, or a company apartment, or a company-financed education 
for one’s children.  And we do not tax them when we cannot: when they are 
amorphous and hard to quantify, like the collegiality of one’s colleagues, or 
the prestige that goes with a certain line of work.  But the conventional 
wisdom seems doubtful.  More likely, we do not tax most nonpecuniary 
benefits because the logical implication of doing so would be to say that 
a wealthy but unhappy CEO should be taxed less than a blissfully happy 
mendicant monk who earns his keep by begging.  It is not that we are 
trying to encourage people to become mendicant monks.  We just do not 
view their extra utility as grounds for putting an extra tax burden on them. 
Raw utility also does not count for much with most doctrines in 
criminal and tort law.  Suppose a defendant were to argue that the 
enormous risk he imposed on others as he sped to his job interview was 
justified by the enormous utility he would derive from having a 
successful interview.  His utility counts for nothing.  Rather, we say that 
the job interview entitles him to impose a risk of a certain amount on 
others, and no more, quite regardless of his personal feelings in the 
matter.  Or suppose a defendant were to argue that the lethal force he 
used to defend his property was justified because he valued his property 
more dearly than his person, and whatever self-defense would ordinarily 
be permitted in defense of one’s person, he should be permitted to use in 
defense of his property instead.  Once again his utility counts for little.  
Rather, we say that the defense of his property entitles him to the use of 
a certain amount of force, and no more, quite regardless of his feelings 
in the matter.  Or suppose a defendant were to argue that the crime he 
committed because he was threatened with the destruction of his prized 
book manuscript should be excused on grounds of duress (even though 
such a serious crime would ordinarily only be excused if he had faced a 
threat to life and limb) because, he says, this manuscript was dearer to 
him than either life or limb.  Once again we would take no account of his 
utility.  Rather, we would say that the protection of his manuscript 
simply does not entitle him to the kind of indulgence we would grant if 
he were trying to preserve life or limb.9 
 
 9. We have here but a manifestation of a phenomenon Thomas Scanlon drew attention 
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B.  The Basic Dilemma, More Precisely Stated 
So far, what I have said simply suggests a very general tension 
between one’s common sense reaction to the original example of the tort 
victim and the way the law treats gains and losses of raw utility.  But the 
tension, and the paradoxes it raises, can be made far more precise.  Let 
us elaborate somewhat on our original example.  The car crash victim 
and aspiring athlete, having had her leg broken, is brought to the 
emergency room.  She already realizes, let us suppose, that, in the end, 
this accident is actually going to make her life better rather than worse: 
It will allow her to escape from a variety of commitments she has made 
for what she had already concluded was going to be a very unhappy life 
as a professional athlete.  Now, as it happens, the injury to her leg is not 
the only one she suffered.  She also did some slight damage to one of her 
pinkies.  She is a passionate hobby pianist and is greatly worried that 
even slight but permanent damage to her pinkie might interfere with this 
avocation.  Consequently, when she arrives at the emergency room, she 
immediately asks the doctor to attend to her pinkie rather than her leg.  
The doctor is ready to do as she asks him, but then another patient is 
wheeled into the emergency room.  This one has a somewhat damaged 
arm—an injury, let us say, halfway in severity between a broken leg and 
a damaged pinkie.  Whom should the doctor attend to first? 
As between the arm and the pinkie, it seems clear the doctor should 
attend to the arm first.  That is what the law would require: The damage to 
the arm is a more serious matter than the damage to the pinkie.  Therefore, 
that patient has a greater claim to the doctor’s attention.  If the doctor fails 
to attend to him first, he is negligent.  Moreover, the law here seems to 
mirror our moral judgment in the matter. 
All right, so the doctor turns away from the pinkie and to the second 
patient’s arm. 
But is that in fact what he should be doing?  There is a third injury in 
the picture we have so far not taken account of.  Is it not clear that, as 
between the second patient’s arm and the first patient’s broken leg, the 
broken leg deserves priority?  A broken leg seems a more serious matter 
than a damaged arm (or so we stipulated, anyway).  Therefore, that 
 
to in a famous essay, Preference and Urgency.  T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655 (1975).  “The fact that someone would be willing to forego a decent diet in order to build a monument to his god does not mean that his claim on others for aid in his project has the same strength as a claim for aid in obtaining enough to eat . . . .”  Id. at 659–60.
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patient has a greater claim to the doctor’s attention, and if the doctor 
fails to attend to her first, he is negligent.  In this too the law seems to 
mirror our moral judgment. 
Fine, so let us have the doctor turn away from the arm and toward the 
first patient’s leg. 
At this point, however, the first patient protests: She says she would 
much rather have the doctor treat her pinkie than her leg.  She points out 
that she would be suffering a far more severe harm if she lost the use of 
her pinkie than the loss of her leg: After all, the loss of the leg would 
chiefly have the effect of derailing her athletic career, and that is more 
than counterbalanced by the increased happiness she can expect from 
that.  So should the doctor acquiesce in her wish? 
Now the doctor finds himself in a cycle: The arm beats out the pinkie; the 
leg beats out the arm; the pinkie beats out the leg, and the arm beats out the 
pinkie.  The cycle results from combining the common sense position that 
the derailed athlete’s increased happiness should be netted out against losses 
with the law’s position that one’s claims under the negligence doctrine are 
not dependent on one’s subjective valuation of those claims.  Breaking the 
cycle requires giving up on one of these two eminently plausible positions.10  
 
 10. The particular way in which I just illustrated the tension between the common sense position and that of the law is not the only way of dramatizing the conflict.  Here is another, which builds on some very startling, recent work by Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, and raises what I have come to call the Cooter-Porat paradox.  (They do not quite think of it as a paradox, but here their modesty got in the way of their analysis.)  See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others? 
Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2000).  In their article, they ask us to consider the following case: John discovers that the buckle on his seat belt is broken.  Buckling it is impossible.  No statute requires drivers to wear seat belts.  The speed limit is 30 miles per hour.  Time is very valuable to John this morning, so he decides to drive unbuckled.  John drives 30 miles per hour, his car skids, and he hits Tony’s parked car.  If John had driven 25 miles per hour, then he would have avoided hitting Tony’s car.  Considering John’s risk to himself and John’s risk to Tony’s car, the reasonable speed to drive was 25 miles per hour.  Considering only John’s risk to Tony’s car, the reasonable speed to drive was 30 miles per hour.  The rule of law is negligence.  In a suit for damages by Tony, should the court find John liable? 
Id. at 19–20.  They note the following: In conventional legal applications of the Hand Rule [of negligence], courts balance the burden of precaution to the injurer and the risk of harm to the victim.  In this example, the court would not admit evidence on the broken seat belt.  Risk to the injurer is treated as irrelevant to his legal liability. 
Id. at 20.  It is hard to see how anyone could quarrel with the courts’ position: Of course the courts would not admit such evidence!  Why should they?  What does the defendant’s nonfunctional seat belt have to do with the price of tea in China?  What matters is whether the defendant was negligent toward his victim, not whether he was, as it were, “negligent” toward himself, an already absurd notion.  The defendant’s seat belt use is a matter of total irrelevance. 
Wrong, say Cooter and Porat, the defendant’s seat belt is highly relevant to the issue of 
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Therein, I believe, lies the central dilemma raised by the “raw utility” 
cases.11 
IV.  THE THIRD CLUSTER: THE CONTRACT DAMAGES QUESTION 
Consider the promisee of an enforceable contractual promise asking to be put in the position he would have been in had the promise been kept. 12 
 
negligence.  Id. at 22–25.  Think about it this way, their ingenious argument runs: Because of the broken seat belt, the defendant’s cost of slowing down has dropped!  It has dropped because that cost has two components, a positive and a negative one.  The positive component is whatever disadvantage accrues to the defendant from slowing down.  The negative component is the increased safety he derives from slowing down.  In other words, his total cost is the difference between the safety benefit from slowing down and the disadvantage from arriving at his destination a little later.  Because his seat belt is broken, the negative component—the increased safety from slowing down—is larger than it would otherwise be.  As a result, the cost to him of slowing down is less than for someone with functional seat belts.  Thus, surprisingly enough, the seat belts really do matter to our assessment of negligence.  Id. As I said, Cooter and Porat do not present their argument as a paradox.  They present it as a correction of what they perceive as a common mistake in assessing negligence.  Id. at 25–28.  The reason I think that what they have uncovered is a paradox is that the argument for disregarding the defendant’s seat belt use is considerably stronger than they acknowledge.  What supports the courts’ refusal to take self-risk into account is nothing less than the Pareto principle, and in urging their “correction,” Cooter and Porat are violating the Pareto principle.  That does not mean that they are wrong.  I do not view the Pareto principle as sacrosanct.  But it does mean that the arguments on both sides of the issue are quite balanced, which is why we have a paradox.  I will explain this more fully in Leo Katz, Choice, Consent and Cycling—Why Our Desires Count for So Little in the Criminal and Tort Law and Why That Can Probably Not Be Helped (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Now let us connect the Cooter-Porat paradox with the problem at hand—whether to take into account the increased happiness experienced by the athlete with the broken leg.  Suppose our would-be athlete is thinking about whether to take a certain precaution while engaging in a risky activity.  Specifically, let us assume that the activity carries only one risk for him, that of breaking his leg.  Taking the precaution would reduce both the risk to bystanders and the risk to his own leg.  But, of course, he does not much value that last bit of risk reduction.  The Cooter-Porat argument tells us that that is irrelevant.  The reduction in the risk to his leg should nonetheless be taken into account in determining whether he was negligent.  See Cooter & Porat, supra, at 31–32.  In other words, the benefit he derives from having his leg broken should be ignored.  Of course the Cooter-Porat argument is just one side of a paradox.  So it ultimately is not clear whether his benefit from having his leg broken should count.  The Cooter-Porat paradox thus turns out to be just another manifestation of what I called the “raw utility problem.” 
  11. I first introduced an example like this one in KATZ, supra note 5, at 53–55.  I explore its ramifications more fully in a work in progress.  See Katz, supra note 10.  12. Letter from Larry A. Alexander, supra note 1. 




Everybody understands that there is a problem about contract 
damages.  The above-quoted case is really just a somewhat elliptical 
statement of it.  Douglas Laycock’s casebook, Remedies, offers a less 
elliptical statement: “[T]he fundamental principle of damages is to 
restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the position he would 
have been in but for the wrong . . . , ‘[his] rightful position’ . . . .”  He 
goes on to explain: 
    As you undoubtedly learned in first-year contracts, the victim of a breach of contract is entitled to recover the profits he would have earned if the contract had been performed.  But it is not obvious that that should be the remedy. . . .   In remedies terms, the question is what we mean by rightful position: the position plaintiff occupied before he made the contract, or the position he would have occupied if the contract had been performed?13 
In terms of baselines, the question is why the baseline for measuring 
contract damages is “the position plaintiff occupied before he made the 
contract”—the “reliance measure”—rather than the position he would 
have occupied if the contract had been performed—the “expectations 
measure.”  Fuller and Perdue, in their classic article on the subject, The 
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, toy with, but are ultimately not 
quite satisfied with, a sort of psychological explanation.  In response to 
the question, “Why should the law ever protect the expectation 
interest?,” Fuller and Purdue say the following: 
    Perhaps the most obvious answer to this question is one which we may label “psychological”. . . .  The breach of a promise arouses in the promisee a sense of injury.  This feeling is not confined to cases where the promisee has relied on the promise.  Whether or not he has actually changed his position because of the promise, the promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such that a breach of the promise causes him to feel that he has been “deprived” of something which was “his”.  Since this sentiment is a relatively uniform one, the law has no occasion to go back of it.  It accepts it as a datum and builds its rule about it.     The difficulty with this explanation is that the law does in fact go back of the sense of injury which the breach of a promise engenders.  No legal system attempts to invest with juristic sanction all promises.  Some rule or combination of rules effects a sifting out for enforcement of those promises deemed important enough to society to justify the law’s concern with them.  Whatever the principles which control this sifting out process may be, they are not convertible into terms of the degree of resentment which the breach of a particular kind of promise arouses.  Therefore, though it may be assumed that the impulse to assuage disappointment is one shared by those who make and influence the law, this impulse can hardly be regarded as the key which solves the whole problem of the protection accorded by the law to the expectation interest.14 
 
 13. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 14–15, 22 (1st ed. 1985).
  14. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 
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More recently, Richard Posner, in an early application of economic 
analysis to law, has suggested that expectations damages are more 
efficient than reliance damages because they lead the breaching party to 
take into account the full value of the cost he is imposing on the 
aggrieved party.15  Not everyone has been convinced.  After all, there are 
two ways of describing cost in this case—the reliance version and the 
expectation version—and the reliance version is considered pretty 
efficient when it comes to torts.  Just exactly why would it not be 
suitable for contracts as well?16 
And then there are some who deny that there is any problem at all.  In 
an approach dating back to Aquinas and Grotius, and more recently 
advocated by Randy Barnett, the following way of looking at the matter 
has been put forward.17  Consider by way of analogy a case we have 
considered before: The defendant gratuitously confers some benefit to 
the plaintiff—say, by rescuing him from drowning or from the prospect 
of some other kind of injury to his person or his property.  Having 
successfully completed the rescue, the defendant subsequently inflicts 
some harm on the very things he saved: He throws the drowning victim 
back into the water, or hurts him in some other way, or destroys some of 
the goods he prevented from being damaged in the first place.  Here too 
there are two possible baselines one might use for measuring his 
damages.  One could ask the defendant to restore the plaintiff to the 
position he would be in if the defendant had never undertaken to do 
anything for him in the first place—this is the analogue to the reliance 
measure.  Or one could ask the defendant to restore the plaintiff to the 
position he would be in if the defendant had not performed any harmful 
actions subsequent to the rescue—this is the analogue to the expectations 
measure.  Now in this case we are relatively clear that the latter measure 
is the only proper one.  Why then, ask Grotius and Aquinas and Barnett, 
should we not say exactly the same thing about the contracts case?  Why 
not view the promisor’s promise as transferring something out of the 
possession of the defendant into the hands of the plaintiff, and then treat 
the breach of the promise as inflicting a harm by retrieving it, much as 
 
1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 57–58 (1936) (footnotes omitted).
  15. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 108–11 (3d ed. 1986).  16. For more on the shortcomings of this explanation, see Richard Craswell’s contribution to this symposium.  Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: 
A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135 (2003).
  17. Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24, 40–43 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). 
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we treat throwing someone who has been saved back into the water as a 
harm, despite the fact that the victim is no worse off than if he had never 
been saved in the first place? 
I do not agree with Aquinas and Grotius and Barnett that there is no 
real problem concerning contract damages.  Rather, I think, like Laycock, 
Fuller, Perdue, and Posner, that there is something here crying out to be 
explained. But the analogy used by Aquinas, Grotius, and Barnett makes 
it clear, I think, that the problem is a little different from what it is 
usually understood to be.  Let me go on, then, to explain what I think the 
real problem of expectation damages is. 
B.  The Basic Dilemma: The Real Issue Behind the                       
Contract Damages Question 
It is an ill-understood fact that not all legal and moral entitlements are 
equal in strength.  One measure of the strength of an entitlement is what 
you can do to protect yourself against its infringement and what you can 
do to get vindication from a successful infringement.  By this measure, 
your strongest entitlement is to the physical integrity of your person and 
of your property.  If someone tries to harm you, or what is yours, you 
can resist him with force, and you can demand full compensation for any 
losses you incur. 
By the same measure, you have a somewhat weaker entitlement not to 
be subject to certain nonphysical attacks against yourself or what is 
yours.  If someone slanders you, or seeks to alienate the affections of 
your spouse, or intentionally inflicts emotional distress, to name just the 
best-established of the nonphysical torts, you are no longer permitted to 
use force as a means of self-help.  For the most part, your only recourse 
is to seek compensation in the courts. 
It is important to note something easily overlooked about the concept 
of the “strength” of an entitlement.  It has nothing to do with the 
monetary value of the entitlement.  An injury to your body may be far 
less serious than an injury to your reputation, in terms of the dollar 
amount of compensation you are due, despite the fact that the former 
infringes a much more serious entitlement than the latter. 
There is, I believe, yet a weaker kind of entitlement than the two 
mentioned so far, although its existence has rarely been clearly 
acknowledged in legal scholarship.  Consider the following: D cheats on 
some law school exams, thereby disadvantaging his classmates.  In a 
subsequent job interview, D ends up going toe-to-toe with V, one of 
those classmates.  D gets the job ahead of V, because of his slightly 
better grades in the courses in which he cheated.  Could V bring a suit 
against D seeking to demonstrate that D cheated and should compensate 
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V for the lost job opportunity?  It is clear that D committed a wrong, and 
it is also clear that the wrong caused harm to V, quite possibly greater 
harm than a more traditional crime or tort might have.  Nevertheless we 
would be extremely reluctant to grant D a cause of action.  The entitlement 
V would be seeking to vindicate just seems too ethereal. 
If one has not previously considered the possibility of this kind of 
case, it might seem as though this example is bound to be a very peculiar 
and isolated one.  But it is not.  Here is another example of a similarly 
weak entitlement: D lives in a state with a duty-to-rescue statute, like 
Vermont’s: Anytime a bystander can easily save someone from certain 
death, he is required to do so.  The statute imposes a small fine on those 
who fail to heed this duty.  Now suppose that D sees someone who is in 
the process of drowning; he could easily rescue him, yet fails to do so.  
He clearly falls within the Vermont statute.  Is he liable for murder, or 
wrongful death?  Black letter law tells us that a defendant who fails to 
heed a statutory duty and thereby causes death is as guilty as if he had 
caused death by an act.  The implicit assumption seems to be that the 
statute creates an entitlement, analogous to a property right, and if that 
entitlement is not honored, this is the equivalent of invading a property 
right and causing a death thereby.  Yet it seems doubtful that in fact all 
statutory duties can serve as the triggers for such homicide liability.  It 
seems doubtful that the Vermont statute would be so viewed.  The 
entitlement it creates quite simply seems too flimsy. 
Here is a final example in the same vein.  D sends a check to V, which 
will save V’s life.  Having deposited the envelope containing the check 
in the mail box, D changes his mind.  He breaks into, and thereby 
damages, the mailbox and retrieves the envelope.  D committed a wrong.  
V of course is the most adversely affected party of D’s actions.  An interest 
of his has been invaded, inasmuch as he could expect that in the ordinary 
course of events the check would reach him, and only a wrongful action 
by someone else, namely D, prevented him from actually receiving          
it.  Nonetheless, we would be reluctant, I think, to allow V to be compensated.  
V’s entitlement to that check—namely that he would have gotten it but 
for the unlawful efforts by D to retrieve it—just seems too weak.18 
Let us now look into the entitlements created by a contract.  The 
aggrieved party who is worse off than he would have been if the 
 
 18. Many cases in which an unambiguously adversely affected plaintiff is said to lack standing, or the statute that he invokes is said not to have created a private cause of action, are in fact cases of this weak-entitlement ilk.
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defendant had never made him a promise in the first place (in other 
words, the plaintiff who is seeking his reliance damages) is much in the 
same position as a tort claimant seeking vindication for a nonphysical 
tort, like slander, or alienation of affections, or the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  His entitlement intuitively appears to be of a 
strength that would justify full compensation, but not quite strong 
enough to justify using physical force to defend it, the way he might 
defend his property or his person.  But what about the aggrieved party 
who seeks vindication for his expectation damages?  The expectation 
entitlement seems a good deal more ethereal than the entitlement not to 
be subjected to slander, or alienation of affections, or the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  Is it so ethereal as to rank with the case 
of the disadvantaged law student, or the unrescued drowning victim in 
Vermont, or the unsuccessful check recipient?  It is here, to my mind, 
that the central issue raised by the contract damage question lies.  We 
hesitate about expectation damages because we are not sure that the 
expectations-based entitlement (as opposed to the reliance-based entitlement) 
created by the contract ranks close enough to the entitlement created by 
nonphysical torts to warrant compensation.  We can also now see why 
the analogy used by Aquinas, Grotius, and Barnett will not really work: 
A contract claim is something substantially less sturdy than the transfer 
of a property right, and an infringed contract claim is something 
substantially less serious than an infringed-upon property right.  Whether 
it is so much less serious that it should not be vindicated in court is the 
real contract damage question. 
V.  THE FOURTH CLUSTER: THE FUTURE GENERATIONS CONUNDRUM 
Consider the plaintiff who but for defendant’s tortious conduct would not exist. Consider the descendant of slaves who but for slavery would not have existed, and surely not in the United States.19 
The slavery reparations question represents, I believe, the convergence 
of at least three basic dilemmas.  The best way to get at them is to view 
the slavery reparations question, large as it is, as part of an even larger 
category—that of all cases involving plaintiffs who but for the 
defendant’s tortious conduct would not exist. 
Let us begin by considering an exceedingly simple instance of such a 
case.  Suppose D rapes V.  V has a child.  Does V have a claim for 
compensatory harm?  The rape victim of course does, but does the child?  
It is hard to see reasons why it would.  To be sure, it might have a claim 
 
 19. Letter from Larry A. Alexander, supra note 1.
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in behalf of its parents’ estate.  But that is different.  Does that mean that  
the descendants of slaves who but for slavery would not have existed do 
not have a claim either, at least not a claim in their own (as opposed to 
their parents’) behalf?  No, it does not.  The rape example fails to 
incorporate a number of features arguably crucial for the slavery case.  
Let us try to add such features to our rape example. 
Now I should immediately point out that I will not be striving to take 
account of certain features of the slavery question that are not 
particularly connected to issues of harm: the fact that such claims today 
can only be made against the descendants of the tortfeasors rather than 
the tortfeasors themselves, or even their estates, that they would have to 
be made against the government rather than individuals, that so much 
time has passed since the tort occurred, that many descendants of slaves 
are also the descendants of slave-owners, and numerous other such 
collateral complications.  The kind of claim I shall be imagining is one 
brought by the children of slaves against the actual slave-takers and 
owners or their estates. 
I shall proceed by gradually modifying the original rape case in a way 
that brings it arguably closer to the slavery case. 
A.  First Modification 
Clearly, one thing that is missing from the rape case is some of what is 
usually captured by the reference to the lasting, generation-transcending 
effects of slavery.  Consider then the following variation of the rape case.  
Let’s assume the rapist infects his victim with a disease, and the victim then 
transmits the disease to her child.  Now does the victim’s offspring have 
a persuasive claim?  This turns out to be a remarkably thorny question. 
On the one hand, it seems as though the child has a rather clear-cut 
claim: There is a fairly direct causal route that connects the defendant’s 
wrongdoing with the harmful consequences to the child. 
On the other hand, we now run into what Derek Parfit has called the 
“nonidentity problem.”20  Despite the causal chain connecting the defendant’s 
actions with someone else’s harm, there is the following very basic fact 
casting grave doubt on the victim’s claim: The plaintiff is unable to 
argue that but for the defendant’s wrongdoing, he would be better off—
since but for the defendant’s wrongdoing he would not exist at all. 
Which of these two ways of thinking about the child’s claim is the 
 
 20. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351–80 (1984).
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more persuasive?  Unfortunately each has some rather hard-to-swallow 
implications.  Let us consider more closely the first view, holding that 
since the defendant directly caused the child’s illness, he should be 
liable.  Consider now the case of a woman who decides to have a child, 
even though she knows that she has a genetic disease which she might 
transmit to it.  If we say the rapist is liable because he caused the child’s 
illness, it would seem we would then also have to say that that woman is 
liable as well, since she too is connected by a direct causal chain to the 
illness of her child.  That seems very counterintuitive. 
Let us consider more closely now the alternative view, which would 
preclude liability on the ground that the child cannot say that but for the 
defendant’s actions it would be better off (since it would not exist at all).  
If we follow this view to its full logical conclusion, we would have to 
say that no generation can ever complain about having been harmed by a 
past generation.  Conversely, no present generation need ever worry 
about the impact of its actions on some distant future generation.  The 
reason is that future people will never be in a position to argue that they 
would have been better off but for the wrongful actions of their forbears.  
Had their forbears not behaved wrongfully, they would, incidentally, 
have produced different people, by procreating at different times and 
bringing slightly different sperm together with slightly different eggs.  
Those future people would then in fact have been better off than the 
complainants, but the complainants themselves would not.  This too seems 
like a very counterintuitive conclusion. 
This I take to be one of the basic dilemmas underlying the slavery 
question—the excruciatingly difficult choice between these two 
counterintuitive implications: Either we are forced to blame (and impose 
liability on) a mother who, despite having a genetically transmissible 
disease, decides to have a child, or in the alternative, we are relieved of 
ever worrying about the impact of anything we do on future generations. 
B.  Second Modification 
Let us, for the time being, assume that we are ultimately persuaded to 
seize the horn of the above dilemma that allows us to impose liability on 
the rapist and on the slave-takers (and their estates) for harm resulting to 
their victims’ descendants.  One arguably relevant feature we have left 
out of our analysis so far are the blessings of living in the United States.  
Let us try to modify the rape example so as to incorporate such a feature.  
Here is one way to do it: Suppose that, along with the infectious disease, 
the child also acquires rights to the rapist-father’s very substantial 
inheritance, an inheritance that is far larger than the harm of which the 
child complains.  It seems not implausible to argue that the complained-
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about harm should be netted out against the inheritance and that 
therefore the child might not be entitled to any compensation after all. 
But let us pause to consider whether the inheritance is in fact the right 
way to “model” the blessings element.  Suppose the rapist-father has no 
assets to bestow, but there is a distant relative, who has designated 
certain biological relatives, like the plaintiff, as the beneficiaries under 
his will.  Now it seems a lot less plausible that the inheritance should be 
offset against the harm.  Should the blessings of living in the United 
States perhaps be viewed in this way rather than the other? 
There is a yet a third way in which we could have tried to model the 
blessings element.  We could replace the inheritance with an altogether 
different kind of asset.  We could imagine that the rapist-father has 
genes for a particularly long and healthy life.  In combination with the 
infectious disease, the child can therefore expect to live a life of normal 
length and health.  Now it suddenly seems extremely plausible to net out 
the blessings against the harm. 
Here then lies the second dilemma of the slavery case: Different 
analogies pull us into vastly different directions on the question of which 
benefits of living in the United States should be netted out against the 
harms that continue to haunt the descendants of slaves. 
C.  Third Modification 
Let us continue to suppose the rape victim’s infected child has been 
awarded compensation—in other words, that the liability-creating 
perspective has prevailed.  Indeed, let us assume that the award has been 
in no way diminished by any offsetting collateral benefits.  Suppose now 
that the rape victim’s child, in turn, has a child of its own, to whom this 
same infection gets transmitted.  Does that second generation offspring 
have a claim against the rapist?  Again, two diametrically opposing 
perspectives on the matter present themselves. 
On the one hand, one might argue that, compensation having been paid 
once, all further liability is extinguished.  Once a tort has been compensated, 
it has in effect been undone.  It is as though the rape had never occurred.  
If we view things that way, then the second generation offspring no 
longer have any claim.  The defendant has compensated the rape victim 
and her immediate descendant for the immediate harm they suffered as 
well as the diminished chance of having healthy children down the road.  
From here on out, he is no more responsible to the second generation 
offspring than he would be to anyone else whose parents decided to 
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throw caution to the wind and create a child with congenital problems. 
On the other hand, one might say that any compensation paid the rape 
victim and her direct descendant only covers the harm they suffered.  The 
defendant by his tortious actions has inaugurated a harmful sequence of 
events that is continuing on its way through the generations, and the 
second generation offspring are simply its most recent victims.  They are 
no less entitled to compensation than the first generation offspring.  To 
be sure, the first generation offspring was the one who ultimately made 
the decision to bear a child, and one might thus wonder whether that 
decision might not break the chain of proximate causation.  But the decision 
to have a child would probably not be viewed as sufficiently “voluntary” 
to break the chain, since it would seem rather unreasonable to expect 
someone to just give up on the possibility of parenthood. 
This is the third dilemma raised by the slavery question.  If reparations 
are in fact paid to slave descendants, would those or would those not 
extinguish the claims of future descendants? Two seemingly equally 
plausible but incompatible answers have suggested themselves. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay took up four quite intractable compensation problems and 
tried to show what has made them so intractable.  Although all four 
types of problems can be described as posing a question about baselines, 
they do so in extremely different ways. 
Failure-to-worsen cases are difficult because they seem to require us 
to choose between giving no weight to the particular way in which a 
harm is produced, or in the alternative, viewing it as beneficial if a 
defendant expends great effort to make sure he inflicts a certain harm in 
one way rather than another. 
The raw utility problem is difficult because it seems to require us to 
choose between not treating a loss of utility as a harm, or in the 
alternative, allowing someone to argue he was not negligent because of 
the enormous personal weight he attached to the purpose for which he 
was creating that risk. 
The contract damages question is difficult because it is hard to decide 
whether disappointed expectations are like nonphysical torts or whether 
they are rather like the more ethereal kinds of injury which we do not 
think deserve vindication in court. 
The slavery question is difficult first and foremost because of the 
nonidentity problem, but also because of the thorniness of deciding 
which advantages of living in the United States ought to be offset against 
the damage claim, and because of the uncertain status of slave-
descendants born after reparations payments have been made.  
